So here’s the conflict: companies do (and should) have the right to charge what they think their market will bear. But ordinarily, you’d think that most markets wouldn’t have enough slack in them for a price increase like that one. What we’re seeing is a peculiar part of a generally peculiar market, though. Drug companies are granted a temporary monopoly by the patent system, in recognition of the value of new therapies. Arguing about this tradeoff does not cease, but overall, I think it’s a reasonable system (although one can imagine others, which would involve tradeoffs of their own). But one feature of the existing order is that patents expire (and you’d be surprised how many loud anti-pharma activists don’t seem to realize that). And once they expire, the price comes down as the generic manufacturers get into the market.
That’s how it’s supposed to work, anyway. But in recent years, another strategy has emerged, and Retrophin/Turing are just the most dramatic examples of it. Entire companies have sprung up to take advantage of this sort of leverage – not by discovering their own drugs (too expensive, too risky!) but by buying up existing ones. And the most egregious examples have come in the generic sector. By various means, old generic compounds have ended up as protected species, and several companies have made it their business to take advantage of these situations to the maximum extent possible.
The FDA grants market exclusivity to companies that are willing to take “grandfathered” compounds into compliance with their current regulatory framework, and that’s led to some ridiculous situations with drugs like colchicine and progesterone. (Perhaps the worst example is a company that’s using this technique to get ahold of a drug that’s currently being provided at no charge whatsoever). There are also loopholes that companies are trying to exploit when competitors try to prove generic equivalence: whatever it takes to keep competition away and get unlimited pricing power.