Omnipotence vs Free Will

[Apathy]

Weeeee. Not enough theological posts lately, we definitely need another.

http://www.meaningfullife.com/torah/concepts/Free_Choice/G-dDIVs_Omnipotence_vs_Free_Will.php



Rabbi Akiva would say... All is foreseen, choice is granted, and the world is judged in kindness
Ethics of the Fathers 3:15

These three points, expressed by Rabbi Akiva in one sentence, are interconnected. The statement, “All is foreseen,” raises two questions. The most basic truth about G-d is that He is omnipotent: infinite, all-knowing, present and active in every point of time and space even as He transcends these parameters. But if such is the case, can man’s actions be the product of his independent choice? It’s not just a question of “If G-d knows what I’m going to do, how could I have chosen?”; the more basic problem is: “If G-d’s knowledge of the future is the product of His all-pervading and exclusive power, how can I possess any power that is not utterly subservient to His?”[1]

Yet the principle of free choice is basic to our very definition as moral beings. In the words of Maimonides, if man’s actions were not freely chosen, “how could G-d command us through the prophets ‘Do this’ and ‘Do not do this,’ ‘Improve your ways’ and ‘Do not follow your wickedness’...? What place would the entire Torah have? And by what measure of justice would G-d punish the wicked and reward the righteous...?”[2] How is this to be reconciled with the equally axiomatic principle of G-d’s omnipotence?

The second question raised by the statement “All is foreseen” is: if man is constantly under the scrutiny of G-d, how can he possibly maintain the standard of behavior that this demands? The Talmud says that to make a single superfluous gesture in the presence of a king is a capital offense.[3] If we are perpetually in the presence of the King of all kings, who is the man that might be found righteous before His exacting judgment?

It is to address these two questions that Rabbi Akiva adds, “choice is granted, and the world is judged in kindness.” In answer to the first question, he says: “Choice is granted.” Indeed, man cannot possess any power or volition that is independent of G-d’s. But man does not intrinsically possess the capacity to freely determine his actions; rather, freedom of choice has been granted to man. G-d, who can do whatever He chooses, has given man a capacity that, in essence, belongs to Him alone.

To answer the second question, Rabbi Akiva says: “The world is judged in kindness.” It is true that “G-d stands over [man], and the entire world is filled with His presence; He looks upon him, and searches his reins and heart, to see if he is serving Him as is fitting.”[4] But it is also true that when “G-d first wanted to create the world with the attribute of judgment, He saw that the world could not survive it; so He combined [the attribute of judgment] with the attribute of mercy”[5]; that G-d says: “I do not demand of [My creatures] according to My capacity, but according to their capacity.”[6] A person is always in the presence of G-d, at all times subject to the divine scrutiny and judgment; but this is a scrutiny sensitive to his limitations and vulnerabilities, a judgment tempered with empathy and kindness.

Based on the Rebbe’s talks, Shabbat Parshat Emor 5738 (May 20, 1978); Sivan 23, 5740 (June 7, 1980)[7]

This is an excerpt from "Beyond the Letter of the Law" by Yanki Tauber published by The Meaningful Life Center.

________________________

[1]. The question, “If G-d knows what I’m going to do, how could I have chosen?” is more a difficulty of our time-contexted perception than a true logical paradox. If a fortune-teller should know what you will do tomorrow, does this mean that your actions are compelled by his knowledge? Obviously not: the hypothetical fortune-teller merely “sees” into the future and observes the result of your choice; his knowledge derives from your freely-chosen actions, not the other way around. By the same token, if G-d’s knowledge of the future were to stem from His ability to “see” into the future, this would in no way affect man’s freedom of choice. The paradox of divine foreknowledge and human choice is that G-d’s knowledge of the future is not the product of future events, but a feature of His all-pervasive reality. Nothing exists outside of G-d; He is the cause of all, and nothing outside of Him is the cause for anything in Him. (This is implicit in G-d’s infinity: a truly infinite being must be all-inclusive, since the existence of anything outside of it would imply that there is a boundary beyond which its reality does not extend.) He knows things not because they happen, but because they derive from Him. Hence the question: how does such knowledge of human affairs allow for any choice on the part of man?


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omnipotence

---

So then, anyone up for a discussion?

[Celephais]

Didn't feel like reading the whole thing (it was predestined that I couldn't read all that shit), but I fully think all of our actions are set in stone.

It's all just chemical reactions, my brain thinks it's made a choice, but it's just that more neurons fired one way than the other.
"Already I can see the chain reaction: the chemical precursors that signal the onset of an emotion, designed specifically to overwhelm logic and reason"

[LMingrone]

(This is implicit in G-d’s infinity: a truly infinite being must be all-inclusive, since the existence of anything outside of it would imply that there is a boundary beyond which its reality does not extend.)

This is why you can't argue either way. Humans don't have the power to understand infinity. You always get caught up in the "Well, who created god?" paradox.

[Celephais]

It's like using "eni-meeni minee-mo" when you know that the one picked is the one you don't start on... if you know the outcome of something you're trying to let happen randomly you're not letting it happen randomly.

[Jahira]

I read an article a year or two ago in Time magazine(I think) which had a priest and an atheist answer the same questions. They were quoted and the priest came off with all this heeby-jeeby and pretty much answered any difficult question with "Faith" and the atheist gave the "something sciency that we just haven't proven" answer. I am not going to say it changed my beliefs, but the atheist ended saying if there is a god out there, his "being" is so far out of reach by the human mind, that the great theologian that has ever thought has not even come close to comprehending exactly who God is....if there is one at all.

I sorta liked that, so I no longer deal with these issues.

[Philosopher]

A truly infinite being must be all-inclusive, since the existence of anything outside of it would imply that there is a boundary beyond which its reality does not extend.
I don't understand this claim that a truly infinite being must be "all-inclusive." The explanation following "since . . . " isn't very helpful, either. Infinite things can have boundaries, and they can be such that they aren't all-inclusive. The set of natural numbers, for example, is infinite, but it does not include any member of the set of non-natural numbers. The set of even numbers is also infinite, but it does not include any member of the set of odd numbers; to use the metaphorical language of the quote, its "boundary" does not "extend" into the set of odd numbers.

Perhaps someone will respond by saying that these aren't really counterexamples, since they're (allegedly) not examples of "truly infinite being[s]," but then I'd have to know more about what a "truly infinite being" is -- does the modifier "truly" have some special significance, or are these sets not properly "beings" (perhaps because they're abstract)? I just don't know. As I think about it, I being to wonder if the person who wrote this just means all-inclusive by "truly infinite," in which case, trivially, a truly infinite being is all-inclusive.

Anyway, that's about all I have to say about this right now.

[Back]

Wow. It sounds to me like human existential rationalization to justify the paradox.

Here is a simpler explanation: What ever created all of this is not a shepherd of the human race, just an objective observer of everything it has created.

[Stanley Burrell]

Pflüger's Automaton.


Didn't feel like reading the whole thing (it was predestined that I couldn't read all that shit), but I fully think all of our actions are set in stone.

It's all just chemical reactions, my brain thinks it's made a choice, but it's just that more neurons fired one way than the other.
"Already I can see the chain reaction: the chemical precursors that signal the onset of an emotion, designed specifically to overwhelm logic and reason"

I just searched Google images for AT LEAST six minutes and couldn't find a damn picture of Carlin as The Architect. All I found was this. And it's disturbing:

http://ccinsider.comedycentral.com/photos/uncategorized/samaras_kirkspock.jpg

[Gan]

Didn't feel like reading the whole thing (it was predestined that I couldn't read all that shit...

LOLWIN

I simply chose to exercise my free will not to read all that shit.

[Kranar]

I don't understand this claim that a truly infinite being must be "all-inclusive." The explanation following "since . . . " isn't very helpful, either. Infinite things can have boundaries, and they can be such that they aren't all-inclusive. The set of natural numbers, for example, is infinite, but it does not include any member of the set of non-natural numbers. The set of even numbers is also infinite, but it does not include any member of the set of odd numbers; to use the metaphorical language of the quote, its "boundary" does not "extend" into the set of odd numbers.


That's what I was thinking.

Do people even know what the definition of infinity is before they begin talking about infinite beings?

[Latrinsorm]

So then, anyone up for a discussion?The question has a lot more traction in (certain strains of) Judaism. The (general) Christian version of omnipotence is one that transcends even logic: God can do what is literally impossible; all things are possible for God. Thus, in the (general) Christian framework it's extremely plausible for one being (God) to have absolute sovereignty and control over everything but still have truly autonomous dudes (us) running around, even though that's clearly impossible.

Now, the certain strains of Judaism I refer to hold that God's omnipotence only extends as far as the laws of physics or reality allow; God can do all things that are possible for a being to do (and therefore a virgin birth or trinitarian being for instance are right out, the argument goes). This isn't really to say that there's something beyond even God, but more that God set those things up for a reason and he won't break them. (This also crops up a lot in questions of the problem of evil, c.f. Aquinas and Lewis.) This is kind of implied if you want to make a "versus" here, which makes for frustrating dialogues when people use different meanings for the same word without either knowing it.
but then I'd have to know more about what a "truly infinite being" is -- does the modifier "truly" have some special significance, or are these sets not properly "beings" (perhaps because they're abstract)?Yes, the context of the quote is omnipresence. It is nonetheless phrased poorly from a mathematical standpoint.

[Eoghain]

that kinda shit makes me happy i serve "little gods". They're more readily accessible and willing to help out :D

[Philosopher]

The (general) Christian version of omnipotence is one that transcends even logic: God can do what is literally impossible; all things are possible for God. Thus, in the (general) Christian framework it's extremely plausible for one being (God) to have absolute sovereignty and control over everything but still have truly autonomous dudes (us) running around, even though that's clearly impossible.
This isn't quite right, at least as a characterization of the (general) Christian framework (unless perhaps the modifier "general" is meant to indicate the view of the man on the street, or something like that). Many Christians, and perhaps the majority of them -- and definitely some of their major historical figures -- do not hold this view of omnipotence. Instead, they hold that God is able to do everything that is logically possible; acts that are "literally impossible" are not even possible acts, so God cannot do them, since there is, in this case, no possible act for Him to do. St. Thomas Aquinas (perhaps the preeminent Christian philosopher, and one whose philosophy has been declared to be the official model of the Catholic Church) holds this view, for example, in Summa Theologica, Prima Pars, Question 25, Article 3. Here he is, with emphasis added at relevant spots:

Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing. Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God." For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.
Still, there are some Christians who take the view you've described. Descartes appears to be one of them, for example.

[Latrinsorm]

Ah, but St. Thomas also said that reason alone is not enough to guide man; certainly when confronted with the unfettered magnificence of infinity reason must quail!

[landy]

Logic dictates the answers to these questions. Every action must have an equal and opposite reaction: every action you take or will take is the result of the very first action. The illusion that is choice must most likely be the defense of a reasoning mind shielding itself from the entirely unreasonable reality that it serves no purpose. In fact, the collection of sub atomic particles which together become what you associate with "you" are playing out a mathematical equation that was asked when the universe was born, and if one were to have a machine capable of computing the volume of variables present in this equation, one could literally "predict" the solution.

[Philosopher]

Ah, but St. Thomas also said that reason alone is not enough to guide man; certainly when confronted with the unfettered magnificence of infinity reason must quail!
True enough, and nicely put. :) Still, Thomas does take a definite position -- the position above -- on omnipotence in his discussion of sacred doctrine, and does say that sacred doctrine is a matter of reason and argument (ST, Prima Pars, Q. 1, Art. 8), even if its starting principles are articles of faith. (And, in any case, Thomas isn't the only one to take this position on omnipotence.)

[Apathy]

Stolen, not mine. This is ok, kinda chewy, but there's some meat on it. Ultimate causation is more interesting (to me) than fortunetelling.



Theological determinism comes in two varieties. The first is based on the notion of foreknowledge: if God is an omniscient being, and if omniscience applies to the future (as well as to the past and present), then the future is known by God. But in that case, the future can only be what God knows it to be. No alternatives are possible. If God knows that it is going to rain tomorrow, then, regardless of what the weather forecast might be, it will definitely rain tomorrow. And if God knows that Jerry Falwell will decide to become an atheist sometime next week, then that is what inevitably must happen.

The second kind of theological determinism follows from the concept of divine preordination: if God is the ultimate cause behind everything, then He has preordained all that will ever occur, and once again there can be no deviation from the future's pre-set pattern. The preordination of the future is by definition a kind of determinism, so there is no arguing against it if one accepts the premise. (This is a type of causal determinism; the first kind of theological determinism is not.)

Theological determinism depends, of course, on whether or not God exists. Since there is no evidence for the existence of a supreme being, this kind of determinism is not logically compelling. And even if one accepts God's existence, it does not necessarily follow that God has preordained the future, or that He his omniscient, or that omniscience applies to the future. But for those with orthodox religious views things are not so simple. The notion of foreknowledge, at least, is essential to the orthodox concept of a supreme being. And yet the orthodox also wish to maintain the existence of free will, and thus reject determinism (though there are exceptions which are "orthodox" enough, e.g. Calvinism).

Now, some argue that knowledge of the future does not necessitate the future in any way: I may know that you are going to do x tomorrow, but that does not mean that you aren't freely choosing to do it. Whether or not this is right depends on how strongly we interpret what it means to have knowledge. If knowledge is supposed to imply certainty, then I cannot know that you are going to do x tomorrow unless I can somehow foretell the future. I may have very good reasons to believe that you will do x, and it may turn out that you will do x. But if it was the case that you might not have done x, then I did not really know.

One may of course use the term "knowledge" in a less strict sense in which the above would no longer apply. But when it comes to God's knowledge, as usually understood, there seems no doubt that it ought to be absolutely certain knowledge. God is after all supposed to be infallible.

Another common attempt to resolve the problem of foreknowledge is to claim that God exists outside of time. From this extra-temporal vantage point, God does not know the future beforehand. There is no "before" or "after" for God. Instead, He observes all of existence — past, present and future — as we observe the present. And as a result, His knowledge of the future is not foreknowledge, and so does not conflict with human freedom.

The "outside of time" argument is not easy to analyze because, so far as I can tell, no one knows what it really means to be outside of time. I believe the best way to tackle the argument is to consider how our situation is changed, if at all, on the supposition that God is in fact extra-temporal. God may be outside of time, but we're not. Now, for us the important thing is whether our future is something which is known. Wherever God is, if He knows our future, then from the vantage point of our present selves the future is in fact known. Our situation therefore has not changed in any way. The important thing is not how God possesses knowledge of the future, but that there is such knowledge. And if the future is in fact known, the conclusion that it is determined is unavoidable.

If the foregoing is not completely satisfactory (for as already mentioned the notion of extra-temporality is rather mysterious, so any discussion involving it is open to varying interpretations), there is another argument along the same lines. God, at least on most orthodox views, supposedly interacts with the world. But if there is such interaction with the world, then it must occur at particular points in time. And at those times, from our perspective, God certainly appears to have knowledge of our future.

Since I reject its premises, I do not accept theological determinism (the argument is valid, but not sound). Theological determinism is nevertheless important in that it reveals an inconsistency between the orthodox notions of foreknowledge and free will.

[Apathy]

Logic dictates the answers to these questions. Every action must have an equal and opposite reaction: every action you take or will take is the result of the very first action.

Show me this in a sound, or hell at least valid, argument plz.

[landy]

Show me this in a sound, or hell at least valid, argument plz.

Pick up a physics book for beginners, it should have the laws of physics in it. As with most of the big questions, the answers are simple and often unfulfilling, but no less true.

[Apathy]

Would this beginner's physics book tell me Newton's third law has limited validity when placed into extreme circumstances? Circumstances like, oh maybe, creating a universe?

edit: And to stay the course, and make sure I understand you, do you accept your conclusion that whatever entity created this universe has predetermined all actions for the duration of time?

[landy]

How so? It absolutely applies to the creation of a universe. The only force unaccounted for is the initial action, but every single action henceforth, including everything you do and ever will do, is the result of another action which traces it's source back to the first.

[Philosopher]

Logic dictates the answers to these questions. Every action must have an equal and opposite reaction:
That's a principle of science, though, not logic.


Every action you take or will take is the result of the very first action.
This isn't entailed by the principle you mention above. The above principle says that if something is an action, then it has an equal and opposite reaction. It does not say that every action is the result of some first action; in fact, it says nothing about where action itself originates.


The illusion that is choice must most likely be the defense of a reasoning mind shielding itself from the entirely unreasonable reality that it serves no purpose.
This is only so on a number of controversial assumptions.


In fact, the collection of sub atomic particles which together become what you associate with "you" are playing out a mathematical equation that was asked when the universe was born,
Asked by whom?


and if one were to have a machine capable of computing the volume of variables present in this equation, one could literally "predict" the solution.
If by "predict," you mean "derive" or "deduce," then many recent scientific theories deny this. Standard formulations of quantum mechanics (i.e., the Copenhagen Interpretation), for example, posit two laws, one of which is indeterministic, such that the present state of the universe does not absolutely determine the future state.

[landy]

Science is the manifestation of logical conclusions. I find it hard to believe you couldn't understand how every action is the result of a single initial action. I am not debating the source of the initial action, nor do I know if it will ever be determined what caused it. As far as the question asked at the initial action, obviously I was personifying the event, of course no "question" was asked, it is merely a way to observe the birth of a very long playing out of events. As far as being able to predict a solution, or "deduce" as you felt the need to add a few synonyms, it could absolutely be determined if the theoretical machine was able to handle every variable in the equation.

[landy]

Would this beginner's physics book tell me Newton's third law has limited validity when placed into extreme circumstances? Circumstances like, oh maybe, creating a universe?

edit: And to stay the course, and make sure I understand you, do you accept your conclusion that whatever entity created this universe has predetermined all actions for the duration of time?

I don't think it was an entity, but yes I do believe all actions can and will only happen one way, no choice.

[Philosopher]

I find it hard to believe you couldn't understand how every action is the result of a single initial action.
I didn't say that I couldn't understand this. I understand the claim perfectly well, I think. All I said was that this claim isn't entailed by (or a restatement of) the principle that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.


As far as being able to predict a solution, or "deduce" as you felt the need to add a few synonyms, it could absolutely be determined if the theoretical machine was able to handle every variable in the equation.
This is precisely what the scientific theory that I mentioned denies; to be a bit technical, it says that one cannot deduce the state of the universe after the wave-function collapses, and not because there is some hidden variable that we aren't aware of, but because the relevant scientific law itself is fundamentally indeterministic. According to this theory, it's not that we just don't know or "can't handle" every variable; it's that the universe literally evolves indeterministically. Aside from the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics, the "GRW" interpretation of quantum mechanics also has this feature.

[Kranar]

If by "predict," you mean "derive" or "deduce," then many recent scientific theories deny this. Standard formulations of quantum mechanics (i.e., the Copenhagen Interpretation), for example, posit two laws, one of which is indeterministic, such that the present state of the universe does not absolutely determine the future state.


Well here I go off on a tangent, feel free to ignore...

Quantum mechanics is not indeterministic, even under the Copenhagen interpretration. The wave equation evolves in a perfectly deterministic manner, the problem is that the lack of complete information of notions such as momentum, position, velocity etc... result in ones own ability to predict future events subject to error, but this error is not inherent to the universe itself, only to our understanding of it.

Furthermore, this lack of information is mandatory since concepts like momentum, position, velocity and the like are in themselves nothing more than abstractions of some even more fundamental properties of the universe. The fundamental properties evolve deterministically, it's only our ability to understand these fundamental properties through the use of abstractions such as position and velocity that are subject to the uncertainty principle.

In simpler, yet equally bizzare terms... you can think of quantum mechanics as describing two universes. There is the universe U which we observe and experience day to day, and then there is the universe R which is the actual universe as it fundamentally exists.

In universe U, we humans have come to understand everything in terms of position, velocity, momentum, energy, time, waves and particles and the list goes on and on... however these are all just abstractions that we use to make sense of the universe. However, in universe R, these abstractions do not exist, there are more fundamental properties at play. The issue is how do we, as humans who are accustomed to living in universe U, convert from universe R to the universe U so that we can make sense of what we observe?

The problem is that there are multiple equivalent ways of converting from R to U. The process by which universe R converts to universe U is called by many names, some of which are wave function collapse and state vector reduction. Because it's a one-to-many process, let's say in a given experiment where we observe the path of a photon through a double-slit, there are 5 different ways that R can convert into U, and 2 of those ways result in the photon going left, and 3 of those ways the photon goes right, then with probability 0.4, R will convert to U with the photon going left, and with probability 0.6, R will convert to U with the photon going right.

But this doesn't mean in anyway that it's not deterministic. Universe R could care less about universe U, it goes on its merry way adhering to the wave-equation in a perfectly deterministic manner. The only issue for us humans is the fact that we do not observe R, we can only observe U, and there are multiple ways of converting from R to U which may give the illusion of indeterminism.

I am done on my tangent... but I wrote a more detailed article on quantum mechanics here:

http://forum.gsplayers.com/showpost.php?p=582998&postcount=47

[landy]

I didn't say that I couldn't understand this. I understand the claim perfectly well, I think. All I said was that this claim isn't entailed by (or a restatement of) the principle that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.


This is precisely what the scientific theory that I mentioned denies; to be a bit technical, it says that one cannot deduce the state of the universe after the wave-function collapses, and not because there is some hidden variable that we aren't aware of, but because the relevant scientific law itself is fundamentally indeterministic. According to this theory, it's not that we just don't know or "can't handle" every variable; it's that the universe literally evolves indeterministically. Aside from the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics, the "GRW" interpretation of quantum mechanics also has this feature.

Unfortunately I can't discuss either schools of thought on quantum mechanics you mentioned, as I am unfamiliar with them. However, it would seem to me that saying the universe "evolves" or "progresses" indeterministically is a lot like early man saying the world was flat. It may have looked flat from the ground, but from a better vantage point we found that was not the case.

And this post is entirely superfluous as the post above by Kranar was much clearer. Kudos Kranar.

[Jahira]

Kranar just made me feel smarter. I am going to go explain this to everyone I know.

[Philosopher]

Kranar, you likely know more about this than I do. However, a few comments/questions are worthwhile.

First, a clarificatory comment: when I say, "the Copenhagen Interpretation," or "the standards formulations," I am referring to the formulations of quantum mechanics given by P. A. M. Dirac and John von Neumann. Perhaps that is non-standard usage, and maybe that's where the confusion lies. But isn't it right that this formulation says that the universe is fundamentally indeterministic? I think so. Here is how the philosopher of science Jeffrey Barrett describes it, for example (with emphasis): "The von Neumann-Dirac formulation of quantum mechanics explains [the two-slit experiment] by stipulating that whenever one looks for a particle, that particle's state instantaneously and randomly collapses to a state where the particle has a determinate position . . . the particle's initially spread-out wave function instantaneously and randomly evolves . . . the particle's state randomly evolves." He also says that, on this theory, "the usual wave dynamics is suspended and the state of a system randomly collapses." At another point, he remarks that, "one might lament the loss of classical determinism." So, as far as I understand it, the von Neumann-Dirac interpretation of quantum mechanics does say that the evolution of states (when observed) is fundamentally indeterministic; the deterministic wave dynamics is suspended, such that classical determinism is lost, and the state of the particle evolves randomly.

The same is true of the GRW (Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber) interpretation, although without the "when observed" restriction (the GRW interpretation makes no such reference to observation), as I understand it. The GRW interpretation says that the wave function collapses spontaneously, in accordance with the GRW wave equation, which is itself indeterministic. Michael Tamir, in his, "Freedom, Consciousness, and Indeterminism," writes, for example, that "The GRW interpretation of quantum mechanics is an example of . . . an objectively indeterministic [account of the laws of nature]." It is "objectively indeterministic" in that it posits real indeterminism in the world.

You say the following, but here I think you're describing the Everettian (from Hugh Everett) interpretation of quantum mechanics, not the von Neumann-Dirac interpretation or the GRW interpretation. Isn't that right? The Everettian interpretation (sometimes called the "many worlds" interpretation) does indeed say that everything is deterministic, in just the way that you describe. It says that there is just one law, the wave equation, according to which systems evolve in an entirely deterministic manner, but that we as observers view the results from our own perspectives which are "localized" at one of the "worlds." Isn't that what you're describing here?


The problem is that there are multiple equivalent ways of converting from R to U. The process by which universe R converts to universe U is called by many names, some of which are wave function collapse and state vector reduction. Because it's a one-to-many process, let's say in a given experiment where we observe the path of a photon through a double-slit, there are 5 different ways that R can convert into U, and 2 of those ways result in the photon going left, and 3 of those ways the photon goes right, then with probability 0.4, R will convert to U with the photon going left, and with probability 0.6, R will convert to U with the photon going right.

But this doesn't mean in anyway that it's not deterministic. Universe R could care less about universe U, it goes on its merry way adhering to the wave-equation in a perfectly deterministic manner. The only issue for us humans is the fact that we do not observe R, we can only observe U, and there are multiple ways of converting from R to U which may give the illusion of indeterminism.
You seem to be suggesting here that the system evolves deterministically, from one to many, where the "many" are universes, and our perspective is localized to R. That's essentially the Everettian interpretation, as far as I understand it. No?

If all of that's right, then we don't disagree. There is still controversy between Everettians, GRW-ians, and so on, about which interpretation is correct. According to at least some of these interpretations, the evolution of the system is fundamentally indeterministic.

[Philosopher]

As an addendum to my above post, here is a link to a Wikipedia article about "Objective Collapse Theories" of quantum mechanics (of which the GRW interpretation is a species) that seems pretty good: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objective_collapse_theories

Note that, according to objective collapse theories, there is an ontologically real wave function that evolves in a non-linear and indeterministic fashion. So the system is fundamentally indeterministic, according to the GRW interpretation.

Here's also a link about various interpretations of quantum mechanics: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpretation_of_quantum_mechanics#Objective_coll apse_theories. Note what it says of the "objective collapse theories" (including GRW): "In objective theories, collapse occurs randomly ('spontaneous localization'), or when some physical threshold is reached, with observers having no special role. Thus, they are realistic, indeterministic, no-hidden-variables theories. The mechanism of collapse is not specified by standard quantum mechanics, which needs to be extended if this approach is correct, meaning that Objective Collapse is more of a theory than an interpretation. Examples include the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory[2] and the Penrose interpretation.[3]"

[Philosopher]

I'm sorry to reply to my own post again (I'll stop after this), but this might be worth saying in order to avoid unnecessary typing in the future. It seems that Kranar is right about the Copenhagen Interpretation -- it at least can be interpreted so that the indeterminism has to do with our subjective measurements, rather than with the way things fundamentally are -- but not about the GRW interpretation (although I didn't actually mention the GRW interpretation in the post to which he responded, so he didn't actually say anything false about it specifically). The GRW interpretation of quantum mechanics does posit that the universe itself actually evolves indeterministically. Which interpretation is right is still a matter of controversy (the GRW interpretation was only introduced in 1986 and is still being defended). But in any case, on some respected and plausible interpretations of quantum mechanics, there really is indeterminism in the world.

Kranar, you can tell me I'm wrong if I am. :)

[landy]

All moot points when the comet of 2012 comes! All Hail, the Mayan Calendar!

[Latrinsorm]

True enough, and nicely put.Thanks! I certainly don't disagree that Thomas and (famous) others do take the opposing position, I just think I could convince them to switch (which is not as egotistic as it sounds!).
Stolen, not mine.The trouble with the unknown author's line of reasoning is he or she keeps drawing comparisons to what it means for us to know things or for us to avoid things. God's omniscience is far less problematic to free will when viewed in the light of God's omnipotence, as I described earlier. It is literally meaningless to say that something is unavoidable for God or that God must do something; God has an infinite number of avenues to any desired result.
It absolutely applies to the creation of a universe.Nothing in physics applies to the "creation of a universe". The Big Bang is a transition, not a beginning; that is to say, the Big Bang created the universe as we know it (expanding, etc.). The Big Bang did not cause the stuff of the universe to spring into being from nothingness. (Of course, it should be noted that these statements are all derived from the theory of the Big Bang and should not be taken as observations of the event itself.)

From the very law of physics you cite, it follows that the universe has no beginning! Put another way, there literally is no first action from which to derive the rest of existence - putting us in roughly the same boat as trying to predict an ungoverned first mover!
Well here I go off on a tangent, feel free to ignore...Wouldn't it be accurate to say that as we have no understanding of universe R (that doesn't get skewed through our U-vian lens), it's not possible to state whether it is deterministic or not?

[Kranar]

Wouldn't it be accurate to say that as we have no understanding of universe R (that doesn't get skewed through our U-vian lens), it's not possible to state whether it is deterministic or not?

We do have an understanding of R and quantum mechanics provides the complete mathematical framework for describing R in a deterministic manner.

We just don't experience R directly with our senses and so when we make an observation, we convert from R to U. As Philosopher pointed out via the wave-equation (and he/she can correct me), that conversion is random/subject to probability and I am in no position to dispute that. All I'm arguing is that the randomness is not something intrinsic to the universe itself, it is only a subjective randomness that exists because our everyday abstractions and experiences of the universe are incomplete.

In other words, just because when I flip a coin I may be unable to predict whether it comes up heads or tails in a deterministic manner, does not mean that the process of flipping a coin is itself non-deterministic. The seemingly random behaviour is a result of my lack of understanding of all the factors that go into the coin toss, such as air friction, angular momentum, initial velocity etc... so rather than try to make all these measurements to get a deterministic picture, I just abstract away all the details and end up with a far simpler model but one that is subject to probabilities.

I hope that makes more sense.

[Deathravin]

Wouldn't THAT be some skill... learning how to flip a coin so it comes up how you want it to... Or be able to accurately predict what it comes us as... Has to be a way.

[Back]

Rosencrantz And Guildenstern Are Dead Script



Heads.



Heads.



Heads.



Heads.



Heads.



Heads.



Heads.



Heads.



Heads.



Heads.



Heads.



Heads.



Heads.



Heads.



Heads.



Heads.



Heads.



Heads.



Heads.



Bet?



Heads I win.



Again...



Heads.



Heads.



Heads.



Heads.



Heads.



Whoops!



It must be indicative of something
besides the redistribution of wealth.



Heads.



A weaker man might be moved
to re-examine his faith,



for nothing else at least
in the law of probability...



Heads.



Consider.



One,



probability is a factor which
operates within natural forces.



Two, probability is not
operating as a factor.



Three, we are now held within um...



sub or supernatural forces.



Discuss!
What?



Look at it this way.
If six monkeys...



If six monkeys...



The law of averages,
if I have got this right means...



that if six monkeys were thrown
up in the air long enough...



they would land on their tails
about as often as they would
land on their...



Heads, getting a bit of
a bore, isn't it?



A bore?
Well...



What about the suspense?



What suspense?



It must be the law
of diminishing returns.



I still spell about to be broken.



Well, it was an even chance.



Seventy eight in a row.
A new record, I imagine.



Is that what you imagine?
A new record?



No questions?
Not a flicker of doubt?



I could be wrong.



No fear?
Fear?



Fear!



Seventy nine.



I think I have it.
Time has stopped dead.



The single experience of one coin
being spun once has been repeated.



A hundred and fifty six times.



On the whole, doubtful.



Or, a spectacular vindication
of the principle.



That each individual
coin spun individually is...



as likely to come down
heads as tails



and therefore should cause no
surprise each individual time it does.



Heads...
I've never known anything like it.



He has never known
anything like it.



But he has never known
anything to write home about.



Therefore it's just nothing
to write home about.



What's the first thing
you remember?



Oh, let's see, hm...



the first thing that comes
into my head, you mean?



No...



the first thing you remember...



No, it's not good. It's gone.
So long time ago.



You don't get my mean.



Most first thing after
all the things you forgot?



Oh, I see.



I've forgotten the question.



Are you happy?



What?
Content? At ease?



Well I suppose so.
What are you going to do now?



I don't know.



What do you want to do?



Look...



What about it?



We have been spinning coins
together since I don't know when...



and in all that time,



if it is all that time, one hundred
and fifty seven coins spun...
consecutively have come down heads



one hundred and fifty seven
consecutive times, and all you can do
is play with your food.



Wait a minute.



There was a messenger.



Rosencrantz... Guildenstern...



We were sent for.

[landy]

Latrinstorm, what I meant when I said those laws applied to the creation of the universe was that those laws applied during the big bang, but of course they do not address the initial existence of matter.

[Philosopher]

As Philosopher pointed out via the wave-equation (and he/she can correct me), that conversion is random/subject to probability and I am in no position to dispute that.
That's right, as far as I understand it (and I'm a he, incidentally). Honestly, though, you likely understand the purely scientific/mathematical side of this better than I do. My familiarity is largely with the related philosophical issues.


All I'm arguing is that the randomness is not something intrinsic to the universe itself, it is only a subjective randomness that exists because our everyday abstractions and experiences of the universe are incomplete.
Yeah, again, this seems consistent with both the Copenhagen Interpretation and the Everettian interpretation, but not with the GRW interpretation. That's okay, of course; just pointing it out. GRW does have its problems, and its open for dispute. I think the Everettian interpretation is actually the most popular.

Also, one thing that you don't quite say to Latrinsorm (and that I think is worth saying) is that we do, in a sense, observe R itself, just indirectly. For example, we observe interference patterns on the phosphorescent screens in the two-slit experiment, which indicates that the particles are behaving as waves "when we're not looking." Further, the wave-like behavior seems to occur in accordance with the Schrodinger wave-equation, and that wave equation is deterministic (i.e., non-probabilistic). So, that's some evidence that we have that R is in fact deterministic. (Of course, a proponent of the GRW interpretation will point to the fact that the collapse of the wave-function is indeterministic, and might go on to say that the Copenhagen and Everettian interpretations of the data are fraught with difficulties (e.g., the "measurement problem," the commitment to "many worlds," etc.), and then argue that the wave-equation itself has to be modified so that it is indeterministic.)

[Latrinsorm]

We do have an understanding of R and quantum mechanics provides the complete mathematical framework for describing R in a deterministic manner.The time evolution of any wave state is wholly determined by the Hamiltonian, though. Why is energy an R quantity and not one of those U abstractions you were talking about?

[Valthissa]

My murky recollection is that Bohm took the stance that the principles of causality did apply under the Copenhagen Interpretation and that introducing quantum potential led to wave functions that are deterministically not observable.

If I was less lazy perhaps I would read up on more modern modes of thinking in physics, but everything I've seen on string theory makes my eyes glaze over.

C/Valth